Europe Must Rearm

The Cold War was the defining geopolitical clash of the late 20th century. From Afghanistan to Vietnam, the U.S.-led capitalist West and the USSR-led communist East each competed to defend their interests. This was especially true for democratic Europe, as it was especially close to Eastern Bloc countries. NATO military planners were primarily concerned about a perceived Soviet manpower and weapons advantage that could enable them to quickly and decisively conquer democratic Europe. To deter this, massive amounts of research and procurement went into building arsenals for Western Europe to defend against a Soviet invasion. By the 1960s, in anticipation of Soviet tanks rolling into the West, the defense spending of West Germany had soared to five percent, rising significantly from the already high norm of 3.7 percent. This shift was reflected in other European countries as they poured significant funds into both deterring and preparing for a Soviet attack. 

Luckily, a Soviet attack never materialized, and gradually, the USSR’s, and later the Russian Federation’s, political influence in Europe would weaken. By 1999, countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, which were former members of the communist military alliance the Warsaw Pact, joined NATO, a trend that would only continue throughout the coming years. Consequently, as the need for high defense systems dropped, so did the spending and federal funding for them. The robust social welfare systems of the EU and UK that we see today benefited massively from the peace dividend, which allowed governments to transfer defense funding towards other avenues of spending, including healthcare and social safety nets. This trend accelerated following the financial crisis of 2008 as governments started to cut back on unnecessary spending. By 2015, the U.S. carried NATO’s spending by a hefty margin, with only 18 of NATO’s 32 members meeting the defense spending goal. 

When European countries reined in defense spending, the differences in their defense platforms and the U.S.’s became clear. Europe still relies heavily on the American defense industry for massive tracts of its defense apparatus, from air defense and next-generation jets to emerging AI-integrated systems. NATO’s European flank continues to struggle with its integrated air defense system, something critical to defending against the Russian hypersonic arsenal, as well as other offensive threats such as deep precision strikes and logistical dangers. It is particularly concerning that in a war to defend itself against Russia, European countries would lack the necessities to adequately protect their citizens. Without a strong air defense system, our European allies would leave their military supply chain open to contest from Russia. Struggles with deep precision strikes would also stop Europe from being able to disrupt Russia’s supply chains well enough. The massive amounts of ammunition, fuel, food, and parts required to sustain a modern army are not obtainable without a strong logistical base—the implications of a potential NATO war effort being compromised would be disastrous. Through the weakening of its conventional military capabilities, Europe has allowed its deterrence credibility to wear away. 

The slow weakening of European deterrence is becoming a more serious problem as Russia becomes more aggressive and the U.S. shifts its defense priorities to Asia. The 2014 annexation of Crimea, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and conflicts in Georgia are all testaments to the current Russian government’s commitment to revanchist policy, or when a country seeks to reassert itself in a position of former power. Russian production of weapons and ammunition has far outpaced NATO as its economy has shifted to focus on its war effort. According to Secretary-General Mark Rutte, Russia is producing three times as much ammunition in just a span of three months as NATO produces in one year. While a Russian invasion of a NATO state seems far off in the present day, this sense of security can only exist so long as deterrence remains strong. 

The traditional provider of such deterrence, the United States, has begun to shift the fulcrum of its foreign policy away from Europe and further east to China. This comes as the U.S. has realigned to view China, rather than Russia, as its main strategic adversary due to China’s economic and technological development. Recently, the Army began to pull combat brigades, including the 101st Airborne, from NATO’s eastern flank as a part of what military leadership says is a refocus from Europe to combat in the Western Hemisphere and Asia. The movement of the 101st Airborne, the only Army airborne assault brigade, is deeply symbolic of shifting priorities. The 101st is an elite unit of the Army that carried out extremely important operations in the Middle East, including ones that occurred during the Gulf War and in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moving such a unit out of Europe indicates the U.S.’s deprioritization of European safety. At the same time, the Marines have begun focusing more and more on combating China and peer adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region. Force Design 2030 outlines how the Marines are trimming legacy programs and expanding into projects such as rapid deployment to the first island chain, a set of islands that surrounds Chinese waters and would likely see combat in a possible U.S.-China conflict, and contesting Chinese ships using amphibious-ready groups. If American focus continues this shift towards Asia, then European rearmament is a must. 

Europe has made significant steps towards rearmament. The European Union aimed to make 50 percent of European procurement from the European domestic arms industry by 2030 to promote a more independent defense system. During NATO’s previous summit, the alliance upped its target for defense spending following pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump. However, significant hurdles still stand in the way. Politically, while most Europeans agree on rearmament and lessened reliance on the American security apparatus, how this will be achieved is still very contentious. Reluctance among younger generations to pay for rearmament and serve in the state military has proved to be a substantial roadblock. Another worry is that the deindustrialization of Europe could create bottlenecks in the possible production of European armaments, especially as European companies struggle even now to arm Ukraine due to these issues. Large-scale reliance on Russian gas in European energy markets has contributed to some of the highest energy prices in the world, aided by the renewables transition, which pushes up costs for manufacturers. On top of this, decades of competition from Asian markets have led to greater outsourcing and the deindustrialization of Europe. 

Within NATO itself, challenges between the member states remain an issue. Spain, which lies farther away from Russia, views issues such as migration from the Sahel as more pressing for their national security and is therefore reluctant to divert spending and attention to rearmament. While most, especially in the east of NATO, support rearmament, the open disagreement between member states shows a possible divergence of priorities in the future, especially as the cost of rearmament ramps up. The solutions for this have been laid out by the EU and NATO: more spending on procuring weapons, and of that spending, more being diverted to homegrown European defense companies. Increased domestic spending would not only strengthen Europe’s ability to defend itself but would also back up Europe’s own independent industrial defense base and future innovation in cutting-edge weaponry. European states must prioritize these solutions if they wish to maintain peace and safety throughout the continent.